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스톡옵션의 決定要因과 經濟的 效果에 關한 實證的 硏究

이상준 2006년

논문상세정보
    • 저자 이상준
    • 기타서명 An Empirical Study on the Determinants and Economic Effects of Stock Option in Korea
    • 형태사항 ⅳ,150p.: 26cm
    • 일반주기 지도교수:김동회, 참고문헌 p:131-143
    • 학위논문사항 2007.2, 학위논문(박사)-, 창원대학교 대학원, 경영학과
    • KDC 325.353, 4
    • 발행지 창원
    • 언어 kor
    • 출판년 2006
    • 발행사항 창원대학교
    유사주제 논문( 2,292)
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' 스톡옵션의 決定要因과 經濟的 效果에 關한 實證的 硏究' 의 참고문헌

  • 우리나라 기업의 스톡옵션 부여패턴
  • 스톡옵션제도 도입 기업의 특성
    김창수 재무연구 [2000]
  • 스톡옵션의 법제 및 세제상의 문제
  • 스톡옵션의 공시효과와 기업 특성
    김창수 재무연구 [2002]
  • 스톡옵션과 기업지배구조
    김창수 [2004]
  • 스톡옵션 부여공시와 주가반응
  • 보상형 스톡옵션의 부여와 기업특성에 따 른 이익조정 패턴
  • Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories
  • When Is Enough, Enough? Market Reaction to Highly Dilutive Stock Option Plans and the Subsequent Impact on CEO Compensation
    Martin R.S.Thomas When Is Enough [2005]
  • Underwriter Certification and Japanese, Seasoned Equity Issues
    Cooney H.K.Kato J.S.Schallheim Underwriter Certification and Japanese [2003]
  • Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends
    Easterbrook [1984]
  • Top-managementCompensation and Capital Structure
  • Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U. S
    Kaplan [1994]
  • Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
    Jesen W.H.Meckling Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior [1976]
  • The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan
    Prowse [1992]
  • The Repricing of Executive Stock Options
  • The Relation between CEO Control and the Risk of CEO Compensation
  • The Pricing of Options and Corpor ate Liabilities
    Fisher Black Myron Scholes The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities [1973]
  • The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview. In M. Aoki, and H. Patrick (Eds.), The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies (pp. 3-50)
    Aoki H.Patrick P.Sheard The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview. In M. Aoki [1994]
  • The Investment OpportunitySet and Corporate Financing, Dividend and CompensationPolicies
    R.Watts Smith Jr The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing [1992]
  • The Influence of Firm-andManager-Specific Characteristics on the Structure of ExecutiveCompensation
  • The Incentives Behind the Adoption of Executive Stock Option Plans in U.S. Corporations
    Long [1991]
  • The Impact of Initiating Payments on Shareholders' Wealth
  • The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock Options
    Carpenter [1998]
  • The Effect of Bank Relations on Investment Decisions: An Investigation of Japanese Takeover Bids
  • The Complexity of Compensation Contracts
    Kole [1997]
  • The Choice of Performance Measures in Annual Bonus Contracts
  • The Association between Executive Stock Option Plan Changes and Managerial Decision Making
  • Taxes and Executive Stock Options
    Hite M.Long [1982]
  • Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership
  • Takeovers Restructuringand Corporate Governance
    J.A.Siu S.C.Kwang Weston Takeovers [1998]
  • Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints
  • Stock-Based Incentive Compensation and Investment Behavior
  • Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock Option Grants
  • Stock Option Compensation and the Likelihood of Meeting Analysts' Quarterly Earnings Targets
  • Stakeholder Management as a Predictor of CEO Compensation: Main Effects and Interactions with Financial Performance
  • Resolving the Agency Problem Problems of External Capital Through Options
  • Research Notes and Commentaries, Organizational Governance and Employee Pay: How Ownership Structure Affects the Firm's Compensation Strategy
    H.L.TosiI L.Gomez-Mejia Werner Research Notes and Commentaries [2005]
  • Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview
    Gillan [2006]
  • Performance Consequences of Mandatory Increases in Executive Stock Ownership
  • Ownership Concentration and Executive Compensation in Closely Held Firms: Evidence from Hong Kong
  • Moral Hazard and Observability
  • Managerial Compensation, Strategy and Firm Performance: An Introduction
    Barkema J.Schwalbach P.Geroski Managerial Compensation [1997]
  • Main Bank Relationships and Capital Structure in Japan
  • Leverage, Volatility and Executive Stock Options
    Choe Leverage [2003]
  • Investment Opportunities and the Structure of Executive Compensation
  • Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial Behavior in the United States and Japan
    Prowse [1992]
  • Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation
  • Incentive Effects of Stock Purchase Plans
  • How Different is Japanese Corporate Finance? An Investigation of the Information Content of New Security Issues
  • Good timing: CEO Stock Option Awardsand Company News Announcements
    Yermack [1997]
  • Firm performance, corporate governance, and topexecutive turnover in Japan
    Kang Shivdasani Firm Performance [1995]
  • Exercise Behavior, Valuation, and the Incentive Effects of Employee Stock Options
    Bettis M.L.Lemmon Exercise Behavior [2005]
  • Executive Ownership, Corporate Value, and Executive Compensation: A Unifying Framework
    Chung Executive Ownership [1996]
  • Executive Compensation and Dividend Policy
    White [1996]
  • Executive Compensation Structure,Ownership, and Firm Performance
    Mehran Executive Compensation Structure [1995]
  • Estimating Betas from Nonsynchronous Data
    [1977]
  • Employee Stock Options Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy
    D.A.Shackelford Graham Employee Stock Options Corporate Taxes [2004]
  • Does the Japanese Governance System Enhance Shareholder Wealth. Evidence from the Stock-Price Effects of Top management Turnover
    Kang [1996]
  • Does Stock Option-Based Executive Compensation Induce Risk-Taking? An Analysis of the Banking Industry
  • Do Executive Stock Option Grants Have Value Implications for Firm Performance?
    Lam [2006]
  • Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?
    Yermack,D. [1995]
  • Dividend Policy, Growth and the Value of the Firm
    Miller M Dividend Policy [1961]
  • DisqualifyingDispositions of Incentive Stock Options:Tax Benefits versusFinancial Reporting Costs
  • Determinants of corporate borrowing
    Myers Determinants of Corporate Borrowing [1977]
  • Detecting Abnormal Operating Performance: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics
    Barber [1996]
  • Corporate Financial Policy, Information and Market Expectations: An Empirical Investigation of Dividends
    Ofer Corporate Financial Policy [1987]
  • Compensation and Performance: the Case of Japanese Managers and Directors
    Ang [1997]
  • Chief Executive Compensation, and Corporate Groups in Japan: New Evidence from Micro Data
    Kato Chief Executive Compensation [1997]
  • CEO stock option awards and the timing ofcorporate voluntary disclosures
  • CEO incentives and earnings management
  • CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants
    Bryant S.Lilien CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity [2000]
  • CEO Compensation and Bank Risk: Is Compensation in Banking Structured to Promote Risk Taking?
    Houston [1995]
  • Are ceos really paid like bureaucrats?
  • Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers
    Kaplan [1994]
  • An Overview of Management Compensation
    Lynch [2003]
  • An Examination of Executive Stock Option Repricing
    Carter [2001]
  • An Empirical Examination of the Costs and Benefits of Executive Stock Options: Evidence from Japan
  • An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation
    Lambert [1987]
  • Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options
  • Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives
  • Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration
    Eaton Agency [1983]
  • Additional Evidence on the Association Between the Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies
    Gaver K.Gaver Additional Evidence on the Association between the Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing [1993]
  • Accounting Earnings and Executive Compensation: The Role of Earnings Persistence
  • A Heteroskedasticity-consistentCovarianceMatrixEstimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity
    White [1980]