연구동향 분석
박사

특허청의 책임운영기관 전환이 특허의 질에 미친 영향

임홍래 2018년

논문상세정보
인용/피인용
' 특허청의 책임운영기관 전환이 특허의 질에 미친 영향' 의 주제별 논문영향력
논문영향력 선정 방법
논문영향력 요약
주제
  • 공공행정과 군사학
  • 가치
  • 질
  • 책임운영기관
  • 타당성
  • 특허
  • 특허청
동일주제 총논문수 논문피인용 총횟수 주제별 논문영향력의 평균
1,110 0

0.0%

' 특허청의 책임운영기관 전환이 특허의 질에 미친 영향' 의 참고문헌

  • 특허청 업무계획 지식재산백서
  • 한국의 책임운영기관에 관한 연구-신제도주의 관점을 중심으로
    김권집 충남대학교 사회과학연구소 「사회과학연구」, 14: 21-44 [2003]
  • 한국의 책임운영기관에 관한 소고
    김재훈 「정부학연구」, 5(2): 177-194 [1999]
  • 한국 책임운영기관의 선정기준 및 확대적 용에 관한 연구
    김근세 박천오 박희봉 「한국행정학보」37(2): 43-65 [2003]
  • 한국 책임운영기관 제도의 운영평가 : 조직구성원의 인식을 중심으로
    김근세 박천오 박희봉 안형기 「한국행정연구」, 12(3): 3-31 [2003]
  • 특허 분쟁의 결정요인에 대한 연구
    주시형 「지식재산연구」, /6(1), , 111-132, 한국지식재산연구원 [2011]
  • 책임운영기관평가제도 개선방안
    박희봉 「한국조직학회보」, 7(2): 93-118 [2010]
  • 책임운영기관제도 도입의 역사적 배경과 운영체계
    강창구 「한국 행정사학지」, 9: 225-253 [2000]
  • 책임운영기관제도 도입의 문제점과 고려사항
    황성돈 「자치의 정」, 2(3): 68-78 [1999]
  • 책임운영기관의 체계적 성과관리방안
    김성철 명지대학교 정부행 정연구센터 「정부행정」, 2: 66-84 [2000]
  • 책임운영기관의 직원만족도 및 조직성과 영향요인
    문영세 「한국 정책연구」, 12(2): 121-145 [2012]
  • 책임운영기관의 성과지표개발에 관한 연구: 운전면허시험 장을 중심으로
    박영원 경기개발연구원 「경기논단」, 2(1): 115-143 [2000]
  • 책임운영기관에 관한 연구
    유 훈 「행정논총, 37(1): 57-72 [1999]
  • 책임운영기관 제도운영의 평가
    김병섭 임보영 정진우 「행정논 총」, 39(1): 65-82 [2001]
  • 책임운영기관 성과평가에 대한 메타평가 모델 설계 연구
  • 우리나라의 특허심사 및 심판에 관한 실증연구: 결정계 "특허심판을 중심으로"
    오준병 추기능 「産業組織硏究」, /20(2), , 17-47, 한국산업조직학회 [2012]
  • 우리나라 책임운영기관 평가제도 및 운영의 개선에 관한 연구
    이남국 「한국거버넌스학회보」, 13(3): 79-111 [2006]
  • 신공공관리와 책임운영기관: 한국의 책임운영기관제도를 중심으로
    김상호 「한국정책연구」, 3(1): 21-39 [2003]
  • 『책임운영기관제도에 관한 비교분석』
    김근세 서울: 집문당 [2000]
  • “특허사건에 대한 특허심판원의 심판 및 법원의 판결 동향에 관한 통계적 연구,”
    정종한 「지식재산연구」, /7(2), , 29-73, 한국지식재산연구원 [2012]
  • “책임운영기관제도 도입 상 문제점과 발전방향”
    박희봉 「한국정책 학회보」, 10(2): 167-188 [2001]
  • van Pottelsberghe, B., 2011. The quality factor in patent systems. Ind. Corporate Change 20 (6), 1755-1793.
  • US Federal Trade Commission, 2003. To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy. Federal Trade Commission, Washington.
  • Tong, X., Frame, J., 1994. Measuring national technological performance with patent claims data. Res. Policy 23, 133?141.
  • Thomas, John R., "Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties" (2001). Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. 306.
  • Sullivan, R. J., 1994. Estimates of the value of patent rights in Great Britain and Ireland, 1852?1876. Economica, 61, 37?58.Economics, 29, 77-107.
  • Sterlacchini, Alessandro. "Patent oppositions and opposition outcomes: evidence from domestic appliance companies." European Journal of Law and Economics 41.1 (2016): 183-203.
  • Somaya, D. 2003. Strategic Determinants of Decisions not to Settle Patent Litigation, Strategic Management Journal 24, 17-38.
  • Shapiro, C., 2004. Patent system reform: economic analysis and critique. Berkeley Technol. Law J. 19, 1017-1047.
  • Shang, R., 2009. Inter partes reexamination and improving patent quality. Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 7, 185-209.
  • Seymore, S., 2012. The presumption of patentability. Minnesota Law Review. 97, pp. 990-1046.
  • Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1991. Standing on the Shoulder of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 29-41
  • Schuett, F., 2013. Patent quality and incentives at the patent office. RAND J. Econ. 44 (2), 313-336.
  • Schettino, Francesco & Sterlacchini, Alessandro & Venturini, Francesco. (2008). Inventive Productivity and Patent Quality: Evidence from Italian Inventors. Journal of Policy Modeling. 35.
  • Schankerman, M., and Pakes, A., 1986. Estimates of the value of patentrights inthe European countries during the post-1950 period. The Economic Journal, 96, 1052-1076.
  • Schankerman, M., 1998. How valuable is patent protection: estimates by technology fields, The Rand Journal of Economics
  • Sampat, B., 2005. Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis. Columbia University mimeo.
  • R. Polk Wagner University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 157, No. 6, Symposium: The Foundations of Intellectual Property Reform (Jun., 2009), pp. 2135-2173
  • Quillen, Cecil D. and Ogden H. Webster, 2001. Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Federal Circuit Bar Jouranl.,11, 1-21
  • Putnam, J., 1996. The value of international patent protection, PhD Thesis, Yale.
  • Priest, G. L. and Klein, B. 1984. The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, Journal of Legal Studies XIII, 1-55.
  • Picard, P., van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B., 2013. Patent office governance and patent examination quality. J. Public Econ. 104(C, 14-25.
  • Petherbridge, L., 2009. On addressing patent quality. University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 158, pp. 13-26.
  • Paul F. Burke and Markus Reitzig Measuring patent assessment quality--Analyzing the degree and kind of (in)consistency in patent offices' decision making Research Policy, 2007, vol. 36, issue 9, 1404-1430
  • Panoma Sanyal & Adam B. Jaffe, 2005. "Peanut Butter Patents versus the New Economy: Does the Increased Rate of Patenting Signal More Invention or Just Lower Standards?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 79-80, pages 211-240
  • Palangkaraya, A., Webster, E., Jensen, P., 2011. Misclassification between patent offices: evidence from a matched sample of patent applications. Rev. Econ. Stat. 93, 10631075.
  • Pakes, A., 1986, Patents as Options: Somine Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks, Econometrica, 54, 755-784.
  • Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2007. "Patents only live twice: a patent survival analysis in Europe," Working Papers CEB 07-028.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Moore, Kimberly A., Worthless Patents (July 2004). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-29.
  • Merrill, Stephen A., Levin, Richard C., Myers, Mark B. (Eds.), 2004s. National Academies of Science, “A Patent System for the 21st Century”. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
  • Merges, R.P., 1999. As many as six impossible patents before breakfast: property rights for business concepts and patent system reform. Berkeley Technology Law Journal 14, 577-603.
  • Mark A. Lemley, 2012. "Fixing the Patent Office," Discussion Papers 11-014, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  • MARC BAUDRY and B?ATRICE DUMONT, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 28, No. 1, Special Issue: Papers Presented at the Third International Industrial Organization Conference Held at the Georgia Institute of Technology's Conference Center, April 8-9, 2005 (February 2006), pp. 41-62
  • Levin, Jonathan and Levin, Richard , "Patent Oppositions" (2002). John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Papers. Paper 283.
  • Lerner, j, 1995, Venture capitalists and the oversight of private firms, the Journal of Finance 50 (1), 301-318
  • Lerner, J., “Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.38(1995. 10), pp.563-595.
  • Lemley, Mark and Carl Shapiro, 2005. Probabilistic Patents, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2), 75-98
  • Lemley, Mark A., “Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office,” Northwestern University Law Review, (2001), 1495-1532.
  • Lemley, M., Sampat, B.N., 2008. Is the patent office a rubber stamp? Emory Law J. 58, 101-128.
  • Lemley, M., 2012. Fixing the Patent Office. NBER working paper #18081.
  • Lei, Z., Wright B, D., 2017. Why weak Patent? Testing the examiner ignorance hypothesis. Journal of Public Economics 148 (2017) 43-56
  • Lanjouw, Jean, Ariel Pakes and Jonathan Putnam, 1998. How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data, Journal of Industrial Economics, XLVI(4), 405-433
  • Lanjouw, J.O., Schankerman, M., 2001. Characteristics of patent litigation: a window on competition. RAND Journal of Economics 32 (1), 129-151.
  • Lanjouw, J., Schankerman, M., 2004. Patent quality and research productivity: measuring innovation with multiple indicators. Econ. J. 114 (4), 441-465.
  • Lanjouw, J. O., 1998. Patent protection in the shadow of infringement: simulation estimations of patent value. Review ofEconomic Studies, 65, 671-710.
  • Kim and Oh(2017), Examination workloads, grant decision bias and examination quality of patent office, Research Policy 46 (2017) 1005-1019
  • Kesan, Jay P., Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 763-797, Spring 2002.
  • Kesan, Jay P. and Gallo, Andres A., Why 'Bad' Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We Change? - the Private and Social Costs of Patents. Emory Law Journal, Vol. 55, pp. 61-140, 2006; U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE05-004.
  • Jaffe, A., Lerner, J., 2004. Innovation and Its Discontents: HowOur Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do about It. Princeton University Press.
  • Harhoff, D., Reitzig, M., 2004. Determinants of opposition against EPO patent grants- the case of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (4), 443?480.
  • Harhoff, D., F. Narin, F. M. Scherer and K. Vopel, “Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Innovation,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 81 (1999), 511-515.
  • Hall, B.H., Graham, S.J.H., Harhoff, D., Mowery, D.C., 2004. Prospects for improving US patent quality via post-grant opposition. In: Jaffe, A.B., Lerner, J., Stern, S. (Eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, vol. 4, pp. 115-143.
  • Hall, B. H., A. Jaffe, and M. Trajtenberg, “Market Value and Patent Citations,” Rand Journal of Economics, 36 (2005), 16-38.
  • Gupeng, Zhang and Xiangdong, Chen, (2012), The value of invention patents in China: Country origin and technology field differences, China Economic Review, 23, issue 2, p. 357-370,
  • Graham, Stuart J.H. & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2014. "Separating patent wheat from chaff: Would the US benefit from adopting patent post-grant review?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(9), pages 1649-1659.
  • Graham, Stuart J. H., Bronwyn H. Hall, Dietmar Harhoff and David C. Mowery, 2002. Post-issue Patent ‘Quality Control’: A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions, NBER Working Paper (8807)
  • Graham, S.J.H., Hall, B.H., Harhoff, D., Mowery, D.C., 2003. Post-issue patent quality control: a comparative study of US patent re-examinations and European patent oppositions. In: Cohen, W.M., Merrill, S.A. (Eds.), Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy. The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C, 74-119.
  • Gans, G., King, S., Lampe, R., 2004. Patent renewal fees and self-funding patent offices. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol. 0(1). Berkeley Electronic Press.
  • Galasso, Alberto and Mark Schankerman. “Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 130, Issue 1, 1 February 2015, Pages 317-369,
  • Ga?tan de Rassenfosse, Adam B. Jaffe, Are Patent Fees Effective at Weeding out Low-quality Patents?, NBER Working Paper No. 20785
  • Frakes, M.D., Wasserman, M.F., 2014. Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence From Micro-Level Application Data. NBER Working Paper 20337.
  • Frakes, M.D., Wasserman, M.F., 2013. Does agency funding affect decisionmaking: an empirical assessment of the PTO's granting patterns. Vanderbilt Law Review. 66, p. 67.
  • Farrell, J., Shapiro, C., 2008. How strong are weak patents? American Economic Review 98 (4), 1347-1369.
  • Farrell, J., Merges, R., 2004. Incentives to challenge and litigate patents. Berkeley Technol. Law J. 19, 943-970.
  • Encaoua, David & LEFOUILI, YASSINE. (2009). Licensing 'weak' patents. Journal of Industrial Economics. 57. 492-525.
  • Cremers, Katrin, Determinants of Patent Litigation in Germany (2004). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 04-072.
  • Choi, Jay Pil, 2005. Live and Let Live: a Tale of Weak Patents, Journal of the European Economic Association, 3, 724-733, 2005.
  • Burke, Paul F. and Reitzig, Markus, (2007), Measuring patent assessment quality--Analyzing the degree and kind of (in)consistency in patent offices' decision making, Research Policy, 36, issue 9, p. 1404-1430
  • Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, 2015. "How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome," NBER Working Papers 21666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Bhaven N. Sampat, David C. Mowery, Arvids A. Ziedonis, Changes in university patent quality after the Bayh?Dole act: a re-examination, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 21, Issue 9, 2003, Pages 1371-1390.
  • Bessen, J., Meurer, M.J., 2008. Patent Failure: How Judges, Lawyers and Bureaucrats Put Innovators at Risk. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
  • Bessen, J., 2008. The value of US patents by owner and patent characteristics. Research Policy, 37(5), 932-945.
  • Bernard Caillaud, Anne Duch ne, Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 29, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 242-252
  • Baudry, M., and Dumont, B., 2006. Patent renewals as options: improving the mechanism for weeding out lousy patents. Review of Industrial Organization, 28, 41-62.
  • Allison, John R., Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore and R. Derek Trunkey, “Valuable Patents,” Georgetown Law Journal, 92 (3), 435, 2004.
  • Allison, John R., Lemley, Mark A., 2000. Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents. American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal 26, 185-228.
  • Allison, John R. and Tiller, Emerson H., The Business Method Patent Myth. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 18, Fall 2003.
  • Allison, J.R. and Lemley, M.A., 1998. Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents. American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal, 26, 185-275.
  • Alan C. Marco, The option value of patent litigation: Theory and evidence, Review of Financial Economics, Volume 14, Issues 3?4, 2005, 323-351.
  • AIPLA (American Intellectual Property Law Association), 2011. Report of the Economic Survey. AIPLA, Washington, D.C.