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자유의지와 과학적 세계관의 양립가능성 : 자유의지의 존재에 대한 옹호

모기룡 2015년

논문상세정보
인용/피인용
' 자유의지와 과학적 세계관의 양립가능성 : 자유의지의 존재에 대한 옹호' 의 주제별 논문영향력
논문영향력 선정 방법
논문영향력 요약
주제
  • compatibilism
  • determinism
  • downward causation
  • free will
  • moral responsibility
  • probabilistic causation
  • randomness
  • rationality
  • 결정론
  • 도덕적 책임
  • 무작위성
  • 양립가능론
  • 자유의지
  • 하향적 인과
  • 합리성
  • 확률적 인과
동일주제 총논문수 논문피인용 총횟수 주제별 논문영향력의 평균
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' 자유의지와 과학적 세계관의 양립가능성 : 자유의지의 존재에 대한 옹호' 의 참고문헌

  • 측정의 사용과 양상 해석
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  • 양자역학의 인과적 해석과 입자궤적의 실재성
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  • 비환원적 유물론은 과연 신화인가?
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  • 배제 논변과 심적 인과
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  • 물리주의의 독단과 오류
    하종호 『철학』, 제71집 151-170 [2002]
  • 리벳실험의 대안적 해석 : 리벳 이후의 뇌 과학적 발견들과 자 유의지
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  • 결정론의 환상과 기능류어로서의 자유의지
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  • 결과논변의 법칙고정성 전제: 자유와 결정론의 양립가능성에 대하여
    홍지호 『철학』, 제78집, 211-231 [2004]
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