연구동향 분석
박사

미국 고위공직자 인준지연에 관한 연구

박은형 2015년

논문상세정보
인용/피인용
' 미국 고위공직자 인준지연에 관한 연구' 의 주제별 논문영향력
논문영향력 선정 방법
논문영향력 요약
주제
  • 공직자 임명
  • 대통령-의회 관계
  • 미국의회
  • 사건사분석
  • 인준지연
  • 정치양극화
동일주제 총논문수 논문피인용 총횟수 주제별 논문영향력의 평균
100 0

0.0%

' 미국 고위공직자 인준지연에 관한 연구' 의 참고문헌

  • 현대 미국정치의 이해
    최명 서울대학교 출판부 [2000]
  • 헌법재판소 재판관 인사청문회에 나타난 정치와 사법의 관계.
    성시영 홍준형 한국사회와 행정연구 23(3): 349-367 [2012]
  • 행정부 고위공직자에 대한 국회의 임명동의 결정요인:국회는 왜 고위공직 후보자 임명에 동의하는가?
    전준영 최준영 한국정치연구 21(2):23-52 [2012]
  • 한국 고위공직후보자 인사검증 시스템
    박천오 박홍엽 한국행정연구,15(1), 101-134 [2006]
  • 특집논문 : 국회 인사청문회의 정치적 의미, 기능 및 문제점.
    손병권 의정연구 29(0): 5-33 [2010]
  • 참여정부 장관인사의 쟁점과 대안에 대한 연구. 한국행정사학지
    남기범 26(단일호), 79-105 [2010]
  • 정무ㆍ고위직 인사 시스템의 비교 분석
    박홍엽 한국행정학보, 39(1),111-137 [2005]
  • 인사청문회제도에 대한 연구
    정일섭 한국지방자치학회보 15(3):191-208 [2003]
  • 인사청문회의 정파적 성격에 대한 원인 분석
    최준영 한국정치연구17(2): 73-94 [2008]
  • 연구논문: 인사청문회법의 입법방향에 관한 고찰. 의정연구
    박종희 최연호 10(단일호), 122-147 [2000]
  • 연구논문 : 정무,고위직 인사제도 개선에 관한 실증적연구: 정치적 임명과정과 국회 인사청문회 등에 대한 함의.
    김판석 박용호 의정연구20(0): 231-266 [2005]
  • 사회과학의 고급계량분석 : 원리와 실제
    이재열 서울 대학교 출판부 [2005]
  • 미국 의회-대통령 관계의 변화와 지속성
    임성호 한국정치학회보, 36(3),333-351 [2002]
  • 마국 공무원제도와 공무원 기본권
    명재진 미국헌법연구, 19(20), 111-143 [2008]
  • 노무현정부 시기의 대통령-의회관계 연구:입법과정을 중심으로
    오승용 서식사회과학논총, 2(2), 125-137 [2009]
  • 국회 인사청문회의 인준요인에 관한 연구 : 후보자 요인과 정치적 요인을 중심으로
    김범진 박사학위논문 [2012]
  • 국무총리 인사청문회의 구성과 운영에 대한 경험적 분석
    조진만 최준영 OUGHTOPIA, 25(3), 299-327 [2010]
  • 국무총리 인사청문회에 나타난 행정부-국회 관계 분석.
  • “인사청문이 고위공직자 임용에 미치는 영향”
    유명희 홍준형 한국인사행정학회보, 10(3), 145-169 [2011]
  • “고위직 공무원 인사검증시스템의 개선방안 모색:노무현 정부의 관련제도 변화와 시사점을 중심으로”
    김판석 정홍원 홍길표 한국인사행정학회보 7(1):109-146 [2008]
  • ___________. (2013). The President and the Congressional Party Leadership ina Hyperpartisan Era. In Thuber(ed.) Rivals for Power, pp.41-62.Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
  • __________. (2012). The contemporary presidency: The personnel process inthe modern presidency. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 42(3),577-596.
  • __________. (2008). The Politics of Presidential Appointments: PoliticalControland Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton University Press.
  • __________. (2008). Senate Executive Business and the Executive Calendar.Senate of the United States: Committees, Rules, and Procedures,313.
  • __________. (2001). Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal AppointmentsProcess.. Duke Law Journals, 50,1687-1835.
  • __________(2009, October). Malign neglect: evidence that delay has become theprimary method of defeating presidential appointments. InCongress & the Presidency (Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 226-243). Taylor &Francis Group.
  • __________(2006, April). The Presumption of Success on PresidentialAppointments Reconsidered: How Delay Has Become the PrimaryMethod of Defeating Nominees. In presentation at the 102ndAnnual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,Boston.
  • __________ (2013). "Senate confirmation of cabinet appointments:Congress-centered, presidency-centered, and nominee- centeredexplanations." The Social Science Journal 50(2): 177-188.
  • __________ (2010). Waiting for Leadership: President Obama's Record inStaffing Key Agency Positions and How to Improve theAppointments Process. Berkeley Law(January 2009), 1-33.
  • __________ (2009). Let's Get It Started What President-elect Obama Can LearnFrom Previous Administrations in Making Political Appointments.Berkeley Law(January 2009), 1-22.
  • __________ (2008). Advice and Consent during the Bush Years-The Politics ofConfirming Federal Judges. Judicature, 92, 320.
  • _________. (2004). Determinants of presidential position taking in Congress,1949?1995. The Social Science Journal, 41(4), 587-604.
  • _________. (2003). “Assessing the Senate Judicial Confirmation Process:The Index of Obstruction and Delay”. Judicature 86, 212-60.
  • _________. (2001c). Unanimous Consent Agreements in the Senate. CQ Press.
  • _________. (2001b). “Senate Executive Business and the Executive Calendar.”Congressional Research Service Report(98-709). Library ofCongress.
  • _________. (2001a). “Unanimous Consent Agreements in the Senate.”Congressional Research Service Report(98-225). Library ofCongress.
  • _________ (2000). The president's agenda: Domestic policy choice fromKennedy to Clinton. JHU Press.
  • _________ (1996). "Senate confirmation of cabinet nominations: Institutionalpolitics and nominee qualifications." The Social Science Journal33(3): 273-285.
  • ________ (2011). Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing PresidentialPowers: The Case of Recess Appointments." Presidential StudiesQuarterly 41(3): 569-588.
  • Wood, B. D., & Marchbanks, M. P. (2008). What determines how long politicalappointees serve?. Journal of Public Administration Research andTheory, 18(3), 375-396.
  • Wilson, J. Q. and Diulio, Jr, J. (2001). American Government. Boston, MA:Hougton Miffin Company.
  • Williams, S. P. (2008). The Power of Footdragging: Bargaining and Delay in theFederal Confirmations Process (Doctoral dissertation, The OhioState University).
  • Wildavsky, Aaron. 1966. The Two Presidencies. Trans-Action, 4, 7-14.
  • Wilcox, C. and Clause, A. (1991). The dimensionality of roll call votingreconsidered. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16: 393-406.
  • Vining Jr, R. L., Steigerwalt, A., & Trochesset, A. (2012). Strategic Timing inthe Appointments Process: Positin Taking on Supreme CourtNominees. Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans,Louisiana, January, 11-14.
  • USA Today, 2011.01.27., Obama ducks a pair of hot-button issues, McLean,Va:USA Today Inc.
  • Troy, T. (2011). Fixing the confirmation process. National Affairs, 7, 82-97.
  • Thurber, J. A. (Ed.). (2013). Rivals for power: presidential-congressionalrelations. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
  • Thurber, J. A. (2010). President Obama, Congress and the Battle with InterestGroups and Lobbyists. In Paper for Conference on AmericanGovernment, Politics and Policy, The American University atSharjah, January (Vol. 25).
  • Therneau, T. M., & Grambsch, P. M. (2000). Modeling survival data: extendingthe Cox model. New York: Springer Science & Business Media.
  • Therneau, T. M. (1997, January). Extending the Cox model. In Proceedings ofthe First Seattle Symposium in Biostatistics (pp. 51-84). New York:Springer US.
  • The Times, 2011.01.11., Rampage launches gun-law debates; Arizona shootingsprompt call to ban high-capacity ammunition clips, Moncton,N.B.(Canada): Postmedia Network Inc.
  • Teter, M. (2012). "Rethinking Consent: Proposals for Reforming the JudicialConfirmation Process." Ohio St. LJ, 73, 287.
  • Strauss, D. A., & Sunstein, C. R. (1992). The Senate, the Constitution, and theConfirmation Process. Yale Law Journal, 1491-1524.
  • Steinmo, S., & Watts, J. (1995). It's the institutions, stupid! Why comprehensivenational health insurance always fails in America. Journal ofHealth Politics, Policy and Law, 20(2), 329-372.
  • Steigerwalt, A. (2004). Death to nominations: Senatorial courtesy, holds, andother ways to kill a court of appeals nomination. In annualmeeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.
  • Sollenberger, M. A., & Rozell, M. J. (2012). The President's Czars: UnderminingCongress and the Constitution. University Press of Kansas.
  • Snyder, S. K., & Weingast, B. R. (2000). The American system of sharedpowers: the President, Congress, and the NLRB. Journal of Law,Economics, and Organization, 16(2), 269-305.
  • Smith, Steven S. (1989). Call To Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate.Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C.
  • Smith, Stephen S., Ian Ostrander, and Christopher Pope. (2013). Majority PartyPower and Procedural Motions in the U.S. Senate." LegislativeStudies Quarterly, 38(2), 205-236.
  • Shull, S. A., & Shaw, T. C. (1999). Explaining congressional-presidentialrelations: A multiple perspective approach. SUNY Press.
  • Shull, S. A. (2000). Presidential-congressional relations: Policy and timeapproaches. University of Michigan Press.
  • Shomade, S. A., Hartley, R. E., & Holmes, L. M. (2014). Lower Federal CourtJudicial Confirmation Fights: A Critical Review of the EmpiricalLiterature and Future Research Directions. PS: Political Science &Politics, 47(1), 149-164.
  • Shipan, C. R. and M. L. Shannon (2003). "Delaying justice (s): a durationanalysis of Supreme Court confirmations." American Journal ofPolitical Science, 47(4), 654-668.
  • Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1954). A method for evaluating the distributionof power in a committee system. American Political ScienceReview, 48(3), 787-792.
  • Shane, P. M. (2013). The Future of Recess Appointments in Light of NoelCanning v NLRB. Bloomberg BNA Daily Report for ExecutivesB1-B5.
  • Sen, M. and W. Spaniel (2013). "How Uncertainty About Judicial Nominees CanDistort the Confirmation Process.“Sinclair, Barbara. (1989). The Transformation of the U.S. Senate. Johns HopkinsUniversity Press.
  • Segal, J. A., Cameron, C. M., & Cover, A. D. (1992). A spatial model of rollcall voting: Senators, constituents, presidents, and interest groupsin Supreme Court confirmations. American Journal of PoliticalScience, 96-121.
  • Segal, J. A. and M. Mak (2009). "Out of the Sample and One Step Ahead:Forecasting Supreme Court Confirmation Votes." Just. Sys. J. 30,123-137.
  • Schweitzer, K. A. (2009). "Litigating the Appointments Clause: The MostEffective Solution for Senate Obstruction of the JudicialConfirmation Process." U. Pa. J. Const. L. 12, 909-1479.
  • Scherer, N., et al. (2008). "Sounding the Fire Alarm: The Role of InterestGroups in the Lower Federal Court Confirmation Process." Journalof Politics 70(4), 1026-1039.
  • Sahu, S. K., Dey, D. K., Aslanidou, H., & Sinha, D. (1997). A Weibull regressionmodel with gamma frailties for multivariate survival data. Lifetimedata analysis, 3(2), 123-137.
  • Sachs, R. C. (2000). Types of Committee Hearings. Congressional ResearchService(98-317), Library of Congress.
  • Rybicki, E. (2013). Senate Consideration of Presidential Nominations: Committeeand Floor Procedure, Congressional Research Service RL31980,Library of Congress,
  • Rutkus, D. S., & Sollenberger, M. A. (2004). Judicial Nomination Statistics: USDistrict and Circuit Courts, 1977-2003. Congressional ResearchService. Library of Congress.
  • Rottinghaus, B. and D. E. Bergan (2011). "The Politics of RequestingAppointments: Congressional Requests in the Appointment andNomination Process." Political Research Quarterly 64(1): 31-44.
  • Rohde, D. W., & Shepsle, K. A. (2007). Advising and Consenting in the 60?VoteSenate: Strategic Appointments to the Supreme Court. Journal ofPolitics, 69(3), 664-677.
  • Rocca, M. S., Sanchez, G. R. and Nikora, R. (2009). The role of personalattributes in African American roll call voting behavior incongress. Political Research Quarterly, 62: 408-414.
  • Roberts, J. M., & Smith, S. S. (2003). Procedural contexts, party strategy, andconditional party voting in the US House of Representatives, 1971?2000. American Journal of Political Science, 47(2), 305-317.
  • Roberts, J. C. (2014). The Struggle Over Executive Appointments. Utah LawReview, 2014(4), 725-756.
  • Riboni, A., & Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2010). Monetary policy by committee:consensus, chairman dominance, or simple majority?. TheQuarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1), 363-416.
  • Pool, Keith and Rosenthal, H. (2001). Dominate after 10 years: A comparativeupdate to congress: A political economic history of roll-callvoting. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 26: 5-29.
  • Pool, Keith and Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A political economic history ofroll call voting. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Pool, Keith and Rosenthal, H. (1991). Patterns of congressional voting.American Journal of Political Science, 35: 228-278.
  • Polsby, N. W. (2004). How Congress evolves: Social bases of institutionalchange. Oxford University Press.
  • Peterson, M. A. (1993). Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hillfrom Eisenhower to Reagan. Harvard University Press.
  • Palmer, E. A. (2005, March). Evolution of the Senate's Role in the Nominationand Confirmation Process: A Brief History. Congressional ResearchService RL31948, Library of Congress.
  • Overby, L. M., Henschen, B. M., Walsh, M. H., & Strauss, J. (1992). Courtingconstituents? An analysis of the Senate confirmation vote onJustice Clarence Thomas. American Political Science Review,86(04), 997-1003.
  • Ostrander, I. (2013). Winning the Waiting Game: Senatorial Delay in ExecutiveNominations (Doctoral dissertation, Washington University).
  • Ornstein, N.J., Mann, T.E., Malbin, M.J., & Rugg, A.(2013), Brookings Institution,& American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. VitalStatistics on Congress. Library of Congress.
  • Ornstein, N.J., Mann, T.E., & Malbin, M.J. (1997). Vital Statistics on Congress:1997-1998. CQ-Roll Call Group Books. Library of Congress.
  • Oppenheimer, Bruce I. (1985). Changing Time Constraints on Congress:Historical Perspectives on the Use of Cloture, in CongressReconsidered. 3rd ed. CQ Press.
  • Oleszek, Walter J. (1999). “Holds in the Senate.” Congressional ResearchService Report(98-712). Library of Congress.
  • O'Connell, A. J. (2008). "Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top AgencyPositions." Southern California. law Review, 82, 913-1000.
  • Nokken, T. P., & Sala, B. R. (2000). Confirmation dynamics: a model ofpresidential appointments to independent agencies. Journal ofTheoretical Politics, 12(1), 91-112.
  • Nixon, D. C., & Bentley, R. M. (2006). Appointment delay and the policyenvironment of the National Transportation Safety Board.Administration & Society, 37(6), 679-694.
  • Nixon, D. C. (2001). Appointment delay for vacancies on the FederalCommunications Commission. Public Administration Review, 61(4),483-492.
  • Nixon, D. C. & D. L. Goss. (2001). Confirmation delay for vacancies on thecircuit courts of appeals." American Politics Research 29(3):246-274.
  • New York times, 2013.01.17., Obama Tells Senate That It’s Time to ConfirmA.T.F. Director, NY:New York Times Company.
  • Moraski, B. J. and C. R. Shipan (1999). "The politics of Supreme Courtnominations: A theory of institutional constraints and choices."American Journal of Political Science: 1069-1095.
  • Moe, Terry. (1985). "The Politicized Presidency"." In New Directions inAmerican Politics, ed. John Chubb, and Paul Peterson. Washington,D.C.: Brookins Institution pp. 235-271.
  • Moe, R. C. (1987). Exploring the limits of privatization. Public AdministrationReview, 453-460.
  • Millhiser, Ian. (2010). The Tyranny of the Timepiece." Online.
  • Mezey, M. L. (1989). Congress, the president, and public policy. WestviewPress.
  • McCarty, Nolan. (2004). The Appointments Dilemma." American Journal ofPolitical Science, 48(3): 413-428.
  • McCarty, Nolan, and Rose Razaghian. (1999). Advice and Consent: SenateResponses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885 - 1996."American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 1122-1143.
  • Martinek, W. L., Kemper, M., & Van Winkle, S. R. (2002). To advise andconsent: The Senate and lower federal court nominations, 1977?1998. The Journal of Politics, 64(02), 337-361.
  • Mackenzie, G. Calvin. (1981). The Politics of Presidential Appointments. FreePress.
  • Mackenzie, G. Calvin,(ed). (2001). Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown ofthe Presidential Appointments Process. Brookings Institution Press.
  • Mack, W. R., DeRouen, K., & Lanoue, D. (2013). Foreign Policy Votes andPresidential Support in Congress. Foreign Policy Analysis, 9(1),79-102.
  • Loomis, B. (2001). The Senate and Executive Branch Appointments: AnObstacle Course on Capitol Hill?. The Brookings Review, 32-36.
  • Light, P. C. (2004). Late for Their Appointments. Online. Brookings Institute.URL: http://www. brookings. edu/opinions/2004/1116governance_light. aspx.
  • Light, P. (1995). Thickening Government: Federal Hierarchy and the Diusion ofAccountability. Brookings Institution Press.
  • Lewis, David E. (2003). Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: PoliticalInsulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy,1946-1997. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA.
  • Leof, A. W. (2001). Conflict over confirmation: an examination of the Senateconfirmation process from 1977 to 1998 (Doctoral dissertation,University of California Berkeley).
  • Lee, Frances E. (2009). Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship inthe U.S. Senate. University of Chicago Press.
  • LeLoup, L. T., & Shull, S. A. (1999). The president and Congress: Collaborationand combat in national policymaking. Allyn & Bacon.
  • Law, D. S. (2005). "Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, andthe Prisoner's Dilemma." Cardozo Law Review 26(2): 479-523.
  • Krutz, Glen S., Richard Fleisher, and Jon R. Bond. (1998). From Abe Fortas toZoe Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in theSenate." The American Political Science Review 92(4): 871-881.
  • Krutz, G. S., & Peake, J. S. (2011). President Obama, Congress andInternational Agreements: An Initial Assessment. In APSA 2011Annual Meeting Paper.
  • Krehbiel, K. (1998). Party discipline and measures of partisanship. AmericanJournal of Political Science, 212-227.
  • Korb, L. J., & Rothman, A. (2013). Formalizing the Ban: My Experience in theReagan Administration. Journal of homosexuality, 60(2-3), 273-281.
  • King, J. D. & J. W. Riddlesperger Jr. (1984). "Presidential CabinetAppointments: The Partisan Factor." Presidential Studies Quarterly14(2): 231-237.
  • Kernell, Samuel. (1997). Going Public. Washington D.C.: Congressional QuarterlyPress.
  • Kellerman, B. (1984). Leadership as a political act. Leadership: multidisciplinaryperspectives, 4,63-89.
  • Kate Schuler, 2006.03.30., FDA Standoff Could Suit White House Needs, CQToday News, Congressional Quarterly, Washington, D.C:CQ RollCall Inc.
  • Kastellec, J. P., et al. (2010). "Public opinion and Senate confirmation ofSupreme Court nominees." Journal of Politics 72(3): 767-784
  • Kalt, B. C. (2011). Politics and the Federal Appointments Process. Harvard Law& Policy Review Online.
  • Jung, K., Moon, M. J., & Hahm, S. D. (2008). Exploring the Linkage BetweenMinisterial Leadership and Performance in Korea. Administration &Society, 40(7), 667-690.
  • Johnson, T. R. and J. M. Roberts. (2004). "Presidential capital and the SupremeCourt confirmation process." Journal of Politics 66(3): 663-683.
  • Human Events, 2000.02.04., Will Lott back Inhofe on stopping Clinton judges?,Washington D.C.:Human Events Publishing Inc.
  • Howell, W. G., Jackman, S. P., & Rogowski, J. C. (2012). The WartimePresident: Insights, Lessons, and Opportunities for ContinuedInvestigation. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 42(4), 791-810.
  • Holmes, L., et al. (2011). "The confirmation obstacle course: Signalingopposition through delay." American Review of Politics, 54:193-214.
  • Hollibaugh, G. E. (2014). Vacancies, vetting, and votes: A unified dynamicmodel of the appointments process. Journal of Theoretical Politics,0951629813518129.
  • Hogue and Bearden. (2013). “Recess Appointments Made by President BarackObama:, Congressional Research Service Report R42329.
  • Hendershot, M. E. (2010). From Consent to Advice and Consent CyclicalConstraints within the District Court Appointment Process. PoliticalResearch Quarterly, 63(2), 328-342.
  • Hartley, R. E. and L. M. Holmes. (2002). "The Increasing Senate scrutiny oflower federal court nominees." Political science quarterly 117(2):259-278.
  • Harris, Joseph P. (1953). The Advice and Consent of the Senate: A Study ofthe Confirmation of Appointments by the United States Senate.University of Californial Press.
  • Haglund, E., & Lewis, D. E. (2013). Politicization and Compliance with the Law:The Case of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998.
  • Gupta, S., & Newberry, K. (1997). Determinants of the variability in corporateeffective tax rates: Evidence from longitudinal data. Journal ofAccounting and Public Policy, 16(1), 1-34.
  • Groseclose, T., & McCarty, N. (2001). The politics of blame: Bargaining beforean audience. American Journal of Political Science, 100-119.
  • Grant, J.T. (2013). Event History Analysis. The Wiley-Blackwel Ency clopediaof Social and Political Movements.
  • Goodsell, C. T., & Gayo, C. C. (1971). Appointive control of federal regulatorycommissions. Administrative Law Review, 291-303.
  • Goldman, Sheldon. (1997). Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection fromRoosevelt through Reagan. New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • Goldman, Sheldon, and Elliot Slotnick. (1999). “Picking Judges Under Fire.”Judicature 82, 265-84.
  • Garhardt, M.J. (2000). The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional andhistorical Analysis. Durham, NC:Duke University Press
  • Fischer, Karin, 2003.08.26. Lane finally to take federal position, Panel advisesnational leaders on trade issues, Charleston Daily Mail, WashingtonD.C., Charleston Newspapers.
  • Epstein, L., Segal, J. A., Staudt, N., & Lindstadt, R. (2004). Role ofQualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the US SupremeCourt, The. Fla. St. UL Rev., 32, 1145.
  • Epstein, L., Lindstadt, R., Segal, J. A., & Westerland, C. (2006). The changingdynamics of Senate voting on Supreme Court nominees. Journal ofPolitics, 68(2), 296-307.
  • Epstein, L., & Segal, J. A. (2005). Advice and consent: The politics of judicialappointments. Oxford University Press.
  • Edwards III, G., & Wayne, S. (2009). Presidential leadership: Politics and policymaking. Cengage Learning.
  • Edwards III, G. C., & Barrett, A. (2000). Presidential agenda setting inCongress. In Polarized politics: Congress and the president in apartisan era (pp. 109-33). Washington, DC: CQ Press.
  • Dull, M., & Roberts, P. S. (2009). Continuity, Competence, and the Successionof Senate?Confirmed Agency Appointees, 1989?2009. PresidentialStudies Quarterly, 39(3), 432-453.
  • Derouen, K., Peake, J. S., & Ward, K. (2005). Presidential mandates and thedynamics of Senate advice and consent, 1885-1996. AmericanPolitics Research, 33(1), 106-131.
  • Denton, B. (2009). "While the Senate Sleeps: Do Contemporary Events Warranta New Interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause?"Catholic University Law Review 58, 751-770.
  • Deering, C. J., & Maltzman, F. (1999). The politics of executive orders:Legislative constraints on presidential power. Political ResearchQuarterly, 52(4), 767-783.
  • Davidson, R. H. (2013). The Presidency and Congressional Time. InThuber(ed.) Rivals for Power, pp.87-112. Rowman & LittlefieldPublishers.
  • David M. O’Brien(1988). Judicial Roulette: Report of the Twentieth CenturyFund Task Force on Judicial Selection. New York: Priority Press.
  • Cox, G. W. and McCubbins, M. D. (1993). Legislative Leviathan: PolicyGovernment in the house. Berkely, CA: University of CaliforniaPress.
  • Corley, P. C. (2006). Avoiding advice and consent: Recess appointments andpresidential power. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36(4), 670-680.
  • Comiskey, M. (2006). "The Senate Confirmation Process and the Quality of U.S.Supreme Court Justices." Polity 38(3): 295-313.
  • Collier, K., & Sullivan, T. (1995). New evidence undercutting the linkage ofapproval with presidential support and influence. The Journal ofPolitics, 57(1), 197-209.
  • Chiou, F. Y., & Rothenberg, L. S. (2013). Executive appointments: duration,ideology, and hierarchy. Journal of Theoretical Politics,0951629813505724.
  • Chang, K. H. (2001). "The president versus the Senate: appointments in theAmerican system of separated powers and the federal reserve."Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17(2): 319-355.
  • Carter, Stephen L. (1994). The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the FederalAppointments Process. Basic Books.
  • Carrier, Michael A. (1994). When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of theRecess Appointments Clause?" Michigan Law Review 92(7):2204-2247.
  • Carpenter D.H. & Garvey T. (2013). Practical Implications of Noel Canning onthe NLRB and CFPB(CRS Report R43032). Library of Congress.
  • Carey, M. P. (2012). Presidential Appointments, the Senate’s ConfirmationProcess, and Changes Made in the 112th Congress. Library andCongress.
  • Campbell, D. E. (2012). "To “Advice and Co?n?s?e?n?t?Delay”: The Role ofInterest Groups in the Confirmation of Judges to the FederalCourts of Appeal." Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy8(1): 1.
  • Cameron, Charles M. (2000). Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics ofNegative Power. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
  • Calvert, Randall, Mathew McCubbins, and Barry Weingast. (1989). A Theory ofPolitical Control and Agency Discretion." American Journal ofPolitical Science, 33(3): 588-611.
  • Buchanan, B. (1988). The Six-Year One Term Presidency: A New Look at anOld Proposal. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 129-142.
  • Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., & Jones, B. S. (2004). Event history modeling: Aguide for social scientists. London: Cambridge University Press.
  • Bonica, A., Chen, J., & Johnson, T. (2012). Estimating the Political Ideologies ofAppointed Public Bureaucrats: An Application to the SenateConfirmation of Presidential Nominees. In Annual Meeting of theSociety for Political Methodology Chapel Hill, NC.
  • Bond, J. R., Fleisher, R., & Krutz, G. S. (2002, August). Maligned neglect: HowSenate consideration of presidential nominations has changed. InPrepared for presentation at the 98th Annual Meeting of theAmerican Political Science Association, Boston.
  • Bond, J. R., & Fleisher, R. (2000). Congress and the President in a PartisanEra. In Polarized politics: Congress and the President in a partisanera (pp. 1-8). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Bond, J. R., & Fleisher, R. (1990). The president in the legislative arena.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Blossfeld, H. P., Golsch, K., & Rohwer, G. (2012). Event history analysis withStata. Psychology Press.
  • Blossfeld, H. P. (2001). Techniques of event history modeling: New approachesto casual analysis. Psychology Press.
  • Black, R.C., Anthony J. Madonna, Ryan J. Owens, & Lynch, S.M. (2007). AddingRecess Appointments to the President's "Tool Chest" of UnilateralPowers.", Political Research Quarterly, 60, 645-654.
  • Binder, S. A., Madonna, A. J., & Smith, S. S. (2007). Going nuclear, Senatestyle. Perspectives on Politics, 5(4), 729-740.
  • Binder, S. A., & Maltzman, F. (2002). Senatorial Delay in Confirming FederalJudges, 1947-1998. American Journal of Political Science, 46(1),190-199.
  • Binder, S. A. (1999). The dynamics of legislative gridlock, 1947?96. AmericanPolitical Science Review, 93(3), 519-533.
  • Beth, R. S., & Bach, S. (2003, March). Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate.Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
  • Berenbaum, F., Henrotin, Y., & Fosang, A. (2010). Welcome from the Presidentand Congress Chairs. Osteoarthritis and Cartilage, 18, iii.
  • Bell, L. C. (2002). "Senatorial discourtesy: The Senate's use of delay to shapethe federal judiciary." Political Research Quarterly 55(3): 589-607.
  • Becker, R. T. (2006). Other Nuclear Option: Adopting a ConstitutionalAmendment to Furnish a Lasting Solution to the Troubled JudicialConfirmation Process, The. Penn St. L. Rev., 111, 981.
  • Baumgartner, F.R., Brouard, S., Grossman, E., Lazardeux, S.G., & Moody, J. (2014).Divided Government, Legislative Productivity, and Policy Changein the USA and France. Governance, 27(3), 423-447.
  • Bailey, M., & Chang, K. H. (2001). Comparing presidents, senators, and justices:interinstitutional preference estimation. Journal of Law, Economics,and Organization, 17(2), 477-506.
  • Ansolabehere, S., Syder, M. and Stewart III C. S. (2001). The effects of partyand preferences on congressional roll-call voting. LegislativeStudies Quarterly, 26, 533-572.
  • Andreas, G. & Griffin P. (2013). White House-Congressional Relations in aPolarized Age. In Thuber(ed.) Rivals for Power, pp.41-62. Rowman& Littlefield Publishers.
  • Alter, A. B., & McGranahan, L. M. (2000). Reexamining the filibuster andproposal powers in the Senate. Legislative Studies Quarterly,259-284.
  • Allison, P. D. (1984). Event history analysis: Regression for longitudinal eventdata (No. 46). Sage Publications Ltd.
  • Allison, G. W. (1996). "Delay in Senate confirmation of federal judicialnominees." Judicature, 80(8), 8-15.
  • Aldrich, J. H., & Rohde, D. W. (2000). The consequences of party organizationin the House: The role of the majority and minority parties inconditional party government. In Bond & Fleisher(Eds.). Polarizedpolitics: Congress and the president in a partisan era, pp. 31-72,CQ Press.
  • Aldrich, J. H. (1995). Why parties? The origin and transformation of partypolitics in America (Vol. 15). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Aberbach, J. D. and B. A. Rockman. (2009). "The appointments process andthe administrative presidency." Presidential Studies Quarterly,39(1), 38-59.
  • ---------. (2009). Revisiting the Administrative Presidency: Policy, Patronage,and Agency Competence." Presidential Studies Quarterly 31(1):60-73.