연구동향 분석
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기업의 지배구조와 가치의 통합적 고찰 : 지배구조 개선효과와 기업집단을 중심으로

김영식 2015년

논문상세정보
인용/피인용
' 기업의 지배구조와 가치의 통합적 고찰 : 지배구조 개선효과와 기업집단을 중심으로' 의 주제별 논문영향력
논문영향력 선정 방법
논문영향력 요약
주제
  • agency problem
  • business group
  • firm value
  • governance
  • governance improvement
  • 기업가치
  • 대리인문제
  • 재벌
  • 지배구조
  • 지배구조개선
동일주제 총논문수 논문피인용 총횟수 주제별 논문영향력의 평균
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' 기업의 지배구조와 가치의 통합적 고찰 : 지배구조 개선효과와 기업집단을 중심으로' 의 참고문헌

  • 현대재무관리, 법문사
  • 한국주식시장에 사후적 지배구조 프리미 엄이 존재하는가?
    박경서 변희섭 이은정 38(4), 423-454 [2009]
  • 한국기업집단의 투자결정과 자본비용
    국찬표 박영석 이정진 재무연구, 13(0), 101-129 [1997]
  • 한국기업의 대리인 비용과 기업가치 외국인 지분의 역할
    박헌준 신현한 최완수 경영학연구 33(2), 655-682 [2004]
  • 최고경영자 교체에 영향을 미치는 요인분석: 경영성과, 전문경영자, 대규모기업집단
    신현한 장진호 경영학연구, 34(1), 289-311 [2005]
  • 지배구조가 투자에 미치는 영향: 과대 및 과소 투자기업을 중심으로
    강윤식 국찬표 재무관리학회, 28(1), 133-164 [2011]
  • 재벌 기업의 대주주경영자는 비재벌기업의 대주주경영자와얼마나 다른가?：한국 상장기업의 소유구조, 자본구조 및 기업 가치에 관한실증연구
    박경서 백재승 재무연구, 14(2), 89-130 [2001]
  • 외환위기와 한국 기업집단의 변화: 재벌의 흥망, 박영사
    장세진 서울 [2003]
  • 외국인투자자와 정보비대칭 간의 관계
  • 소유구조와 경영성과간 인과관계 분석
    김호인 박용삼 POSRI경영연구, 8(2), 32-56 [2008]
  • 소유경영의 역할과 성과
    강원 한창수 삼성경제연구원 [2005]
  • 소유경영 유형이 기업생산성에 미치는 실증적 연구
    황동섭 ( Dong Sub Hwang ) 생산성논집, 19(4), 1-14 [2005]
  • 소유 구조와 기업의 회계적 성과 및 TobinQ의 관계에 관한 연구
    박기성 증권학회지, 30(0), 297-325 [2002]
  • 상품시장에서의 경쟁과 기업의 소유지배구조에 대한 계약론적 접근
    박경서 재무연구, 12(2), 1-42 [1999]
  • 기업집단과 대리인 문제: 재벌및 비재벌 인수기업의 합병성과 비교 연구
    강준구 김진모 배기홍 재무연구, 14(2), 49-88 [2001]
  • 기업지배구조와 주주부의 배분에 관한 연구
    박광우 박래수(Rae Soo Park) 황이석(Lee Seok Hwang) 증권학회지, 34(4), 149-188 [2005]
  • 기업지배구조와 기업성과 및 기업가치 :한국상장기업에 대한 실증연구
    오재영 윤봉한 증권학회지, 34(1), 227-263 [2005]
  • 기업지배구조와 기업가치:투자 효율성과 대리인 비용을 중심으로
    김남곤 박영석 경영학연구, 36(5), 1203-1232 [2007]
  • 기업의 사회적 책임 활동과 기업가치
    김창수 한국증권학회지, 38(4), 507-545 [2009]
  • 기업가치와 기업소유구조와의 관련성
    김영숙 이재춘 증권학회지, 26(0), 173-197 [2000]
  • 경영자지분율과 재량발생액간의 관계, 그리고 시장경쟁효과
    송길성 경영학 연구, 42(6), 1589-1627 [2013]
  • “후손 승진 공시에 따른 가족기업의 비정상수익률 분석: 국내 재벌기업을 중심으로,”
    박진영 최문섭 최정화 기업경영연구, 52(0), 233-250 [2013]
  • “한국 재벌기업집단의 그룹구조 결정요인에 관한 연구,”
    강형철 박경서 장하성 재무연구, 19(1), 187-230 [2006]
  • “한국 대규모기업집단에서 내부자본시장과 대리인 문제 : 그룹 현금보유의 역할,”
    강형철 장하성 금융연구, 28(2), 101-135 [2014]
  • “한국 대규모 기업집단 가족 지분율의 결정요인에 관한 제도론적 고찰,”
    송재용 윤채린 경영학연구, 37(4), 691-721 [2008]
  • “특집논문 : 상삽의 새로운 동향과 주요쟁점; 기업그룹의 대리인비용과 기업집단 법 논의,”
    김용열 홍익법학, 14(2), 1-26 [2013]
  • “출자총액제한제도가 대기업 자산구성에 미치는 효과에 관한 연구,”
    김민수 성인모 소종일 금융연구, 26(4), 27-60 [2012]
  • “최고경영자 교체에 영향을 미치는 요인분석: 경영성과, 전문경영자, 대규모기업집단,”
    신현한 경영학 연구, 34(1), 289-311 [2005]
  • “재벌의 경영권 승계관정에서의 대리인 문제연구,”
    김주태 조영곤 23(6), 3451-3477 [2010]
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    박순홍 연강흠 경영학연구, 35(6), 1885-1912 [2006]
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    강준구 나현승 이인무 재무연구, 19(2), 1-40 [2004]
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    소병천 법학연구, 33(2), 839-865 [2009]
  • “기업집단의 분리를 통한 기업집단의 순기능과 역기능에 관한 연구,”
    박경서 정찬식 증권학회지, 40(3), 461-499 [2011]
  • “기업집단의 계열사간 출자와 사업구조,”
    위정범 재무연구, 18(1), 69-92 [2005]
  • “기업지배구조의 정치경제학: 주주모델에 대한 이론적 비판,”
    이왕휘 한국정치학회보, 40(3), 263-290 [2006]
  • “기업지배구조와 주주의 부,”
    백재승 경영교육연구, 10(1), 121-144 [2006]
  • “기업지배구조가 이익과 신용등급간의 관련성에 미치는 효과,”
    박종일 서정우 신재용 경영학연구, 41(6), 1309-1345 [2012]
  • “기업지배구조가 기업가치에 미치는 영향에 있어 일반기업과 금융기관 간 비교 연구”
    박경서 이은정 금융연구, 18(2), 129-155 [2004]
  • “기업지배구조 문헌연구”
    김소연 신현한 금융학회지, 12(3), 29-99 [2007]
  • “기업의 사회적 성과와 재무적 성과의 통합적 고찰,”
    김영식 위정범 대한경영학회지, 24(5), 2913-2950 [2011]
  • “ 기업지배구조는 언제 기업가치에 영향을 미치는가?: 정보비대칭과 자본비용의 관계,”
    변희섭 조영현 재무연구, 23(3), 213-248 [2010]
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